Abstract. Recent work has considered the problem of extending to the case of iterated belief change the so-called 'Harper Identity' (HI), which defines singleshot contraction in terms of single-shot revision. The present paper considers the prospects of providing a similar extension of the Levi Identity (LI), in which the direction of definition runs the other way. We restrict our attention here to the three classic iterated revision operators-natural, restrained and lexicographic, for which we provide here the first collective characterisation in the literature, under the appellation of 'elementary' operators. We consider two prima facie plausible ways of extending (LI). The first proposal involves the use of the rational closure operator to offer a 'reductive' account of iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction. The second, which doesn't commit to reductionism, was put forward some years ago by Nayak et al. We establish that, for elementary revision operators and under mild assumptions regarding contraction, Nayak's proposal is equivalent to a new set of postulates formalising the claim that contraction by ¬A should be considered to be a kind of 'mild' revision by A. We then show that these, in turn, under slightly weaker assumptions, jointly amount to the conjunction of a pair of constraints on the extension of (HI) that were recently proposed in the literature. Finally, we consider the consequences of endorsing both suggestions and show that this would yield an identification of rational revision with natural revision. We close the paper by discussing the general prospects for defining iterated revision in terms of iterated contraction.
Introduction
The crucial question of iterated belief change-that is, the question of the rationality constraints that govern the beliefs resulting from a sequence of changes in view-remains very much a live one.
In recent work [3] , we have studied in some detail the problem of extending, to the iterated case, a principle of single-step change known as the 'Harper Identity' (henceforth '(HI)') [15] . This principle connects single-step contraction and revision, the two main types of change found in the literature, in a manner that allows one to define the former in terms of the latter. We presented a family of extensions of (HI) characterised by the satisfaction of an intuitive pair of principles and showed how these postulates could be used to translate principles of iterated revision into principles of iterated contraction.
But (HI) also has a well known companion principle which reverses the direction of definition, allowing one to define single-step revision in terms of single-step contraction: the Levi Identity (henceforth '(LI)') [20] . To date, furthermore, the issue of extending (LI) to the iterated case has barely been discussed. Two noteworthy exceptions are the short papers of Nayak et al [21] and of Konieczny & Pino Pérez [17] . The second paper argues that no reasonable extension of (LI) will enable us to reduce iterated revision to iterated contraction. The first paper introduces a non-reductionist extension of (LI) consonant with this claim.
The present contribution aims to provide a more comprehensive discussion of the issue, carried out against the backdrop of the aforementioned recent work on (HI). The plan of the paper is as follows. After a preliminary introduction of the formal framework in Section 2, we provide, in Section 3, a novel result that is of general interest in itself. We collectively characterise the three classic belief revision operators that are the focus of the paper (natural, restrained and lexicographic) under the appellation of 'elementary' operators, showing that they are in fact the only operators satisfying a particular set of properties. Section 4 turns to the issue of extending (LI) to the iterated case. We present, in Section 4.1, an extension of (LI) based on the concept of rational closure, which would result in a reduction of two-step revision to two-step contraction. Section 4.2 then discusses the non-reductive proposal of [21] . We first establish that, for elementary revision operators and under mild assumptions regarding contraction, it is in fact equivalent to a new set of postulates formalising the claim that contraction by ¬A should be considered to be a kind of 'mild' revision by A. These, in turn, under slightly weaker assumptions, are proven to jointly amount to the conjunction of the aforementioned constraints on the extension of (HI) that were proposed in [3] . In Section 4.3, we consider the consequences of endorsing both suggestions and show that this would yield an identification of rational revision with natural revision. In Section 5, we briefly discuss the general prospects for defining iterated revision from iterated contraction, critically assessing the central argument of [17] . We conclude, in Section 6, with some remaining open questions.
The proofs of the various propositions and theorems have been relegated to a technical appendix.
Preliminaries
The beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief state Ψ . The latter determines a belief set [Ψ ], a deductively closed set of sentences, drawn from a finitely generated, propositional, truth-functional language L. The set of classical logical consequences of Γ ⊆ L will be denoted by Cn(Γ ). The set of propositional worlds or valuations will be denoted by W , and the set of models of a given sentence A by [[A] ].
We consider the three classic belief change operations mapping a prior state Ψ and input sentence A in L onto a posterior state. The operation of revision * returns the posterior state Ψ * A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the inclusion of A, in such a way as to maintain consistency of the resulting belief set when ¬A ∈ [Ψ ].
The operation of expansion + is similar, save that consistency of the resulting beliefs needn't be ensured. Finally, the operation of contraction ÷ returns the posterior state Ψ ÷ A that results from an adjustment of Ψ to accommodate the retraction of A.
Single-step change
In terms of single-step change, revision and contraction are assumed to satisfy the postulates of Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] (henceforth 'AGM'), while the behaviour of expansion is constrained by [Ψ + A] = Cn([Ψ ] ∪ {A}). AGM ensures a useful order-theoretic representability of the single-shot revision or contraction dispositions of an agent, such that each Ψ is associated with a total preorder (henceforth [14, 16] ). In this context, the AGM postulate of Success (A ∈ [Ψ * A]) corresponds to the requirement that
We denote by TPO(W ) the set of all TPOs over W and shall assume that, for every ∈ TPO(W ), there is a state Ψ such that = Ψ .
Equivalently, these revision dispositions can be represented by a 'conditional belief set' [Ψ ] c . This set extends the belief set [Ψ ] by further including various 'conditional beliefs', expressed by sentences of the form A ⇒ B, where ⇒ is a non-truth-functional conditional connective and A, B ∈ L (we shall call L c the language that extends L to include such conditionals). This is achieved by means of the so-called Ramsey Test,
In terms of constraints on [Ψ ] c , AGM notably ensures that its conditional subset corresponds to a rational consequence relation, in the sense of [19] (we shall say, in this case, that [Ψ ] c is rational).
Following convention, we shall call principles couched in terms of belief sets 'syntactic', and call 'semantic' those principles couched in terms of TPOs, denoting the latter by subscripting the corresponding syntactic principle with ' '.
The operations * and ÷ are assumed to be related in the single-shot case by the Levi and Harper identities, namely
with single-shot revision determining single-shot expansion via a third identity:
, so that Ψ equally represents both revision and contraction dispositions. The motivation for (LI) is the following: The most parsimonious way of modifying [Ψ ] so as to include A is to simply add the joint logical consequences of [Ψ ] and A. However, Cn([Ψ ] ∪ {A}) needn't be consistent. Hence we first 'make room' for A by considering instead the belief set [Ψ ÷ ¬A] that results from making the relevant minimal change necessary to achieve consistency.
Iterated change
In terms of iterated revision, we shall considerably simplify the discussion by restricting our attention to the three principal operators found in the literature. These are natural revision [8] :
) and x Ψ y restrained revision [6] :
and lexicographic revision [22] :
See Figure 1 . All three suggestions operate on the assumption that a state Ψ is to be identified with its corresponding TPO Ψ and that belief change functions map pairs of TPOs and sentences onto TPOs, in other words, they entail:
These are three of the four iterated revision operators mentioned in Rott's influential survey [23] . The remaining operator the irrevocable revision operator of [24] , which has the unusual characteristic of ensuring that prior inputs to revision are retained in the belief set after any subsequent revision.
The proposals ensure that * satisfies the postulates of Darwiche & Pearl [10] . In their semantic forms, these are:
Regarding ÷, we assume that it satisfies the postulates of Chopra et al [9] , given semantically by:
Concerning the relations between the belief change operators in the iterated case, we will be discussing the extension of (LI), as well as that of (TI), later in the paper. Regarding (HI), a proposal for extending the principle to the two-step case was recently floated in [3] . Semantically speaking, this involved the characterisation of a binary TPO combination operator ⊕, such that Ψ ÷A = Ψ ⊕ Ψ * ¬A . Among the baseline constraints on ⊕, were a pair of conditions that were shown to be respectively equivalent, in the presence of (C1 * ) and (C2 * ), to the following joint constraints on Ψ ÷A , Ψ and Ψ * ¬A :
We called operators satisfying such postulates, in addition to (HI), 'TeamQueue combinators'.
Elementary revision operators
In this section, we demonstrate the relative generality of the results that follow by providing a characterisation result according to which natural, restrained and lexicographic revision operators are the only operators satisfying a small set of potentially appealing properties. We shall call operators that satisfy these properties elementary revision operators. We define elementary revision operators semantically by:
We have already introduced (C1 * )-(C4 * ). The remaining principles are new. We call the first of these 'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with respect to the prior TPO', after an analogous precept in social choice. For this, we first define the notion of 'agreement' between TPO's on a pair of worlds:
then offer:
, then, if Ψ and Ψ agree on {x, y}, so do Ψ * A and Ψ * A The second new principle-'Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives with respect to the input'-is formally similar to the first. For this we first introduce some helpful notation:
The principle is then given by:
A and B agree on {x, y}, so do Ψ * A and Ψ * B Although this principle is new to the literature, we note that it can be shown to be equivalent, under our assumptions, to the conjunction of a pair of principles that were recently defended in [5] , where it was shown that they respectively strengthen (C3 * ) and (C4 * ):
is equivalent to the conjunction of:
The final principle is a principle of 'Neutrality', again named after an analogous condition in social choice. To the best of our knowledge, it appears here for the first time in the context of belief revision. Its presentation makes use of the following concept:
and proceeds as follows:
and (IIAI * ) say that the relative ordering of x and y after revising by A depends on only (i) their relative order prior to revision (from (IIAP * )) and (ii) their relative positioning with respect to A (i.e., whether or not they satisfy A) unless one of x or y is a minimal A-world, in which case this requirement acquiesces to the Success postulate (from (IIAI * )). (Neut * ) is a form of language-independence property, stating that the labels (in terms of valuations) of worlds are irrelevant in determining the posterior TPO. The prima facie appeal of these principles is similar to that of their analogues in social choice, substituting a doxastic interpretation of the ordering for a preferential one.
With this in hand, we can now report that:
The only elementary revision operators are lexicographic, restrained and natural revision.
(IIAP * ) significantly weakens a principle introduced under the name of '(IIA)' in [12] , which simply corresponds to the embedded conditional: If Ψ and Ψ agree on {x, y}, so do Ψ * A and Ψ * A . (IIAI * ) amounts to a similar weakening of a condition found in [7] . An interesting question, therefore, arises as to why the stronger principles do not figure in our characterisation.
The unqualified version of (IIAP * ) is only satisfied by * L , assuming (C1 * ) and (C2 * ) and that the domain of the revision function is TPO(W ).
. Then, for any Ψ , there will exist Ψ in TPO(W ) that agrees with Ψ on {x, y} and is such that
Similarly, Booth & Meyer's strong version of (IIAI * ), in conjunction with (C1 * )-(C4 * ), can be shown to entail a principle that we have called '(β1+ * )' in previous work [5] , where we showed (see Corollary 1 there) to characterise lexicographic revision, given AGM and (C1 * )-(C2 * ). The most straightforward syntactic extension of (LI) would involve replacing all belief sets by conditional belief sets, leaving all else unchanged. This would require extending the domain of Cn to subsets of the conditional language L c , which can be naturally achieved by setting, for ∆ ⊆ L c , Cn(∆) = ∆∪Cn(∆∩L). So we would be considering the claim that
. This, however, is a bad idea, since it is easy to show that:
, then there are no consistent belief sets, given the two following AGM postulates: 4 We note that [12] offers a rather different characterisation of lexicographic revision that also involves the unqualified version of (IIAP * ). 5 In the proof of Proposition 1 above, we established the equivalence between (IIAI * ) and the conjunction of (β1 * ) and (β2 * ) using only (C1 * )-(C4 * ). This proof can be adapted to establish a strengthening of Booth & Meyer's Proposition 3 in which, unlike in the original, the principle of 'Independence' (P * ) is not appealed to. In other words: In the presence of AGM and (C1 * )-(C4 * ), Booth & Meyer's strengthening of (IIAI * ) is equivalent to the conjunction of what [5] call '(β1+ * )' and '(β2+
The core issue highlighted by this result is that the right hand side of the equality won't generally correspond to a rational consequence relation, due to the fact that Cn simply yields too small a set of consequences. So a natural suggestion here would be to make use of the rational closure operator C rat of [19] instead of Cn. Indeed, C rat has been touted as offering the appropriately conservative way of extending a set of conditionals to something that corresponds to a rational consequence relation (see [19] ). This gives us the 'iterated Levi Identity using Rational Closure' (or '(iLIRC)' for short):
An alternative extension of (LI) can be obtained by using an iterable expansion operator +. This is the 'New Levi Identity' of Nayak et al, which is briefly presented in [21] . Semantically, it is given by:
Syntactically, in terms of conditional belief sets, we then would have:
It is easily verified that (LI) follows from (NLI ), if one assumes, for instance, that
, which immediately follows from (C1 ÷ ). (NLI ) also has some other interesting general properties. For example, one can show, rather trivially, that:
This result mirrors a result in [3] , in which it was shown that TeamQueue combination allows one to move from each (Ci * ) to the corresponding (Ci ÷ ). Assuming, as Nayak et al do, the following natural semantic iterated version of (TI):
6 Strictly speaking, Crat is an operation on purely conditional belief sets. However, it can be obviously generalised to the case in which the set includes non-conditionals, since for any 7 Nayak et al have little to say about Ψ ⊥ , aside from its being the case that Ψ ⊥ ÷A is such that x ∼Ψ ⊥ ÷A y for all x, y ∈ W . More recently, [11] have suggested that the state resulting from expansion into inconsistency be defined in a more fine-grained manner, in a proposal that involves introducing an 'impossible' world such that w ⊥ |= A for all A ∈ L. We refer the reader to their paper for further details, since nothing here hinges on the distinction between these views.
(iLI * )
In what follows, then, we shall use (NLI ) and (iLI * ) interchangeably. Importantly, while the proposal considered in the previous section was reductive, in the sense that the operator * on the left-hand side of the identity did not appear on the right, (iLI * ) features * on both sides. To date, however, the implications of this principle have not been studied in any kind of detail. In what follows, we offer some new results of interest. We first note: Theorem 2. If * is an elementary revision operator and ÷ satisfies (C1 ÷ )-(C4 ÷ ), then * and ÷ satisfy (NLI ) iff they satisfy the following:
The principles (C1 ÷/ * )-(C4 ÷/ * ) are new to the literature and bear an obvious formal resemblance to the postulates of Darwiche & Pearl and of Chopra et al. Taken together, they require contraction by ¬A to be a kind of 'mild revision' by A, since they tell us that the position of any A-world with respect to any ¬A-world is at least as good after revision by A as it is after contraction by ¬A.
Somewhat surprisingly (to us), it turns out that these principles are also closely connected to the semantic 'TeamQueue combinator' approach to extending the Harper Identity to the iterated case that was proposed in [3] . Indeed, one can show that:
, then * and ÷ satisfy (C1 ÷/ * )-(C4 ÷/ * ) iff they satisfy (SPU ) and (WPU ).
In conjunction with Theorem 2, Theorem 3 entails:
Corollary 1 If * is an elementary revision operator and ÷ satisfies (C1 ÷ )-(C4 ÷ ), then * and ÷ satisfy (NLI ) iff they satisfy (SPU ) and (WPU ). In this particular context, then, (NLI ) simply amounts to the conjunction of a pair of constraints proposed in the context of extending (HI) to the iterated case.
Rational closure and the New Levi Identity
At this stage, we have considered both a potentially promising reductive proposal and a promising non-reductive one. A natural question, then, is: How would these two suggestions fare in conjunction with one another? To answer this question, we provide the semantic counterpart for our first principle, which was formulated only syntactically: Theorem 4. Given AGM, (iLIRC) is equivalent to :
With this in hand, the consequences of endorsing (iLIRC) on the heels of (NLI ) should be obvious: rational iterated revision would have to coincide with natural revision. This raises an interesting question: For each remaining elementary operator * , does there exist a suitable alternative closure operator C, such that
9 Indeed, although rational closure is by far the most popular closure operator in the literature, alternative closure operators have been proposed, including, for instance the lexicographic closure operator of [18] or again the maximum entropy closure operator of [13] . Furthermore, there has been some limited work on potential connections between closure operators and revision operators (namely [2] ). However, this work has only focussed on the relation between lexicographic closure and lexicographic revision and its pertinence to the current problem remains unclear.
Although we do not currently have an answer to our question, we can report that the existence of suitable relevant closure operators will very much depend on the manner in which one extends (HI) to the iterated case. To illustrate, in a previous discussion of the issue [3] , we considered a particular TeamQueue combinator, ⊕ STQ . We showed, in Section 6 of that paper, that for * = * L or * = * R , the equality Ψ ÷A = Ψ ⊕ STQ Ψ * ¬A entails that ÷ = ÷ STQL , where ÷ STQL is an iterated contraction operator that we call 'STQ-Lex'. We can, however, show the following:
Proposition 4 If * = * L or * = * R and ÷ = ÷ STQL , then there exists no closure operator C, satisfying the property of Rational Identity: (RID c ) seems a desirable property of closure operators, which aim to extend a set of conditionals ∆ to that rational set of conditionals whose endorsement is mandated by that of ∆. The standard postulate of Inclusion (∆ ⊆ C(∆)) tell us that C must extend ∆ to a rational superset of ∆. (RID c ) adds to this the notion that if ∆ 'ain't broke', it needn't be 'fixed'. Interestingly, the proof of this impossibility result fails to go through when * = * L and ÷ = ÷ P , where ÷ P is the priority contraction operator of [21] . In [3] we note that priority contraction can be recovered from lexicographic revision via a particular TeamQueue combinator. Furthermore, the same combinator can be used to define a contraction operator from restrained revision (call it ÷ R ). Again, the proof of the above result breaks down when * = * R and ÷ = ÷ R .
Is iterated revision reducible to iterated contraction?
Konieczny and Pino Pérez [17, Theorem 5] plausibly claim that, for a finitely generated language, the cardinality of (i) the set of revision operators that satisfy both the AGM postulates for revision and (C1 * )-(C4 * ) is strictly greater than the cardinality of (ii) the set of contraction operators that satisfy both the AGM postulates for contraction and (C1 ÷ )-(C4 ÷ ). From this, they conclude that there is no bijection between rational iterated revision and contraction operators and hence no reduction of iterated revision to iterated contraction. But this conclusion is not warranted without a further argument to the effect that every member of (i) is rational. In other words, it could be the case that (C1 * )-(C4 * ) need supplementing. This has certainly been the belief of the proponents of the various elementary revision operators that we have discussed in the present paper. And indeed, the proponent of * N could claim, endorsing our ⊕ STQ -based extension of (HI), that rational contraction goes by natural contraction. By the same principle, proponents of * R or * L could respectively claim that rational contraction goes by natural contraction or STQ-Lex contraction, respectively (see [3, Section 6] ). Those are three candidate bijections that are all consistent, furthermore, with (NLI ).
One could nevertheless run an arguably plausible argument to Konieczny and Pino Pérez's desired conclusion based on the observation that natural and restrained revision are both mapped onto natural contraction by the ⊕ STQ method. Even if one thinks that it is implausible to claim that iterated change must comply with one of either restrained or natural revision, it is not implausible to claim that it sometimes may comply with either. In other words: There plausibly exists at least one prior TPO that is rationally consistent with two distinct potential posterior TPOs, respectively obtained via natural and restrained revision by a given sentence A. Given the ⊕ STQ -based extension of (HI), only one posterior TPO can be obtained by contraction by ¬A, namely the one obtained by natural contraction by ¬A. But if this is true, iterated revision dispositions cannot be recovered from iterated contraction dispositions.
Conclusions and further work
We have considered two possible extensions of (LI) to the iterated case: a reductive proposal (iLIRC) based on the rational closure operator, and a non-reductive proposal (NLI ) that involves a contraction step, followed by an expansion. We have shown that, when restricted to a popular class of 'elementary' revision operators, (NLI ) is in fact equivalent, under weak assumptions, to both (i) a new set of postulates (C1 ÷/ * )-(C4 ÷/ * ) and (ii) a pair of principles recently defended in the literature on (HI).
However, it has also been noted that (iLIRC) has strong consequences when conjoined with (NLI ). This suggests the need for (1) a future consideration of various alternatives to the former that make use of surrogate closure operators.
Furthermore, the revision operators of the class that we have focussed on have been criticised for their equation of belief states with TPOs (the principle (Red); see [4] ). One obvious extension of our work would be (2) an exploration of the extent to which the results reported in Section 4 carry over to operators that avoid this identification, such as the POI operators of [5] .
Proof: The proof of this claim closely resembles the proof of Proposition 3 of [7] . We first establish the following lemma: We simply derive (a) , since the proof of (b) is analogous. Assume that x ≺ A y and A and that C do not agree on {x, y}. In other words:
, and either (i)
, and (C4 * ), respectively, we have y Ψ * C x, as required. This completes the proof of Lemma 1.
With this in hand, we can derive each direction of the equivalence:
A y, and y Ψ * A x. If A and C do not agree on {x, y}, then the required result follows by principle (a) of Lemma 1. So assume that they do agree, and hence that x ≺ C y. We now establish that
With this in hand, we can apply (IIAI * ) to derive y Ψ * C x, as required. The derivation of (β2 * ) is analogous.
[C]]) and that
A and C agree on {x, y}. We want to show that x Ψ * A y iff x Ψ * C y. By symmetry, it suffices for this to show that x Ψ * A y implies x Ψ * C y. So assume x Ψ * A y. Since A and C agree on {x, y}, we have three cases to consider:
) and x ≺ C y, it follows by (β2 * ) that y ≺ Ψ * A x, contradicting x Ψ * A y. Hence x Ψ * C y, as required.
(ii) x ∼ A y and x ∼ C y: It follows from this, via (C1 * ) and (C2 * ), that x Ψ * A y iff x Ψ y iff x Ψ * C y. Hence x Ψ * C y, as required.
, y ≺ A x, and x Ψ * A y, that x Ψ * C y, as required. It is obvious that (Neut * ) is satisfied by satisfied by lexicographic, restrained and natural revision operators. It is also well known that these operators satisfy (C1 * )-(C4 * ). We quickly verify here that they also satisfy (IIAP * ):
(a) Regarding lexicographic revision: The principle actually holds without the require-
. We consider 3 cases:
Regarding restrained revision: Here we consider again 3 cases, this time depending on the prior relation between x and y:
Regarding (IIAI * ), we have noted, in Proposition 1, that it is equivalent, in the presence of (C1 * )-(C4 * ), to the conjunction of the principles (β1 * ) and (β2 * ). Proposition 6 of [5] establishes that a family of so-called 'POI operators', which includes lexicographic and restrained revision, satisfies a set of principles that are collectively stronger than (β1 * ) and (β2 * ). However, if one examines their proof of this claim, one can see that it carries over to a broader family of BOI operators, which they mention in their concluding comments and of which all three of our operators are members. Indeed, the proof makes use of the weaker requirement that x + ≤ x − employed in the characterisation of BOI operators, rather than the stronger principle x + < x − characteristic of the POI subfamily.
This completes the proof of Lemma 2. We now show that:
Lemma 3 If an operator is elementary, then it is a lexicographic, restrained or natural revision operator.
(IIAP * ) and (Neut * ) jointly allows us to represent revision by a given sentence A as a quadruple of functions from prior to posterior relations between two arbitrary worlds x and y, such that x, y / ∈ min( Ψ , [[A]]), one for each of the three following possibilities:
] is determined by (1), by virtue of (Neut * )). These functions can be represented by state diagrams in which the set of states is {x ≺ Ψ y, x ∼ Ψ y, y ≺ Ψ x} and the edges represent revisions by A. For example, * L gives us the following diagram for the function associated with (1):
The postulates (C1 * ) and (C2 * ) mean that the functions associated with (2) and (3) simply map each state to itself. So whatever degrees of freedom there are, they are associated with (1) . Furthermore, the postulates (C3 * ) and (C4 * ) entail that the arrows in the diagram of the function associated with (1) do not point downwards, given the convention we are adopting for ordering the states vertically. This leaves us with at most six possible state diagrams:
Diagrams (a), (b) and (c) respectively correspond to * R A, * L A and * N A. However, (d) and (e) are inconsistent with (C2 * ), on pains of triviality. Indeed assume that there exist two worlds y, z
(f) exhibits a similar inconsistency. Consider this time the prior TPO given by y ≺ Ψ {x, w}. We have z ≺ Ψ * A y. Given y ≺ Ψ z, this is again inconsistent with (C2 * ). So we have established that (IIAP * ) and (Neut * ) jointly entail that, for any A, Ψ * A is equal to one of either Ψ * R A, Ψ * L A or Ψ * N A. But it still remains the case that * coincides with one elementary operator for one input but with another elementary operator for another, so that, for example, Ψ * A = Ψ * R A while Ψ * A = Ψ * R A. This is ruled out by the final condition (IIAP * ).
, then there are no consistent belief sets, given the two following AGM postulates: Proof:
. We want to show that x (Ψ ÷¬A)+A y iff x Ψ y. Since ÷ satisfies (C1 ÷ ), we have x Ψ ÷¬A y iff x Ψ y. Since + satisfies (C1 * ), we have x (Ψ ÷¬A)+A y iff x Ψ ÷¬A y, and we are done. Theorem 2. If * is an elementary revision operator and ÷ satisfies (C1 ÷ )-(C4 ÷ ), then * and ÷ satisfy (NLI ) iff they satisfy the following:
Proof: We prove each direction of the claim in the form of a separate lemma. Regarding the right-to-left direction:
Lemma 4 If * is an elementary revision operator, ÷ satisfies (C1 ÷ )-(C4 ÷ ), and ÷ and * satisfy (C1 ÷/ * )-(C4 ÷/ * ), then * and ÷ satisfy (NLI ).
We want to show that, given the relevant assumptions, x Ψ * A y iff x (Ψ ÷¬A) * A y. We consider two cases:
, from which we have, by Success, x ∈ min( (Ψ ÷¬A) * A , W ) and so x (Ψ ÷¬A) * A y, as required.
. From Success, we also have
. Hence x ∈ min( Ψ * A , W ) and and so x Ψ * A y, as required.
The same equivalence can be even more immediately established for the case in which
, we have x ∈ min( Ψ * A , W ) and and so x Ψ * A y, as required. Note that, since we do not assume that ÷ satisfies the obvious analogue for contraction of (IIAP * ), multiple dashed arrows from each state are permitted. Postulates (C3 ÷ ) and (C4 ÷ ) ensure that these dashed arrows do not take us downwards. Postulates (C3 ÷/ * ) and (C4 ÷/ * ) ensure that they do not take us further up than the solid arrow that originates in the same state.
(NLI ) is then satisfied iff any trip along a dashed arrow d and then a solid arrow s ends in the state which is pointed to by the solid arrow s that originates in the same place as d. This is easily verified to be true.
Regarding the left-to-right direction, we will actually prove the following stronger claim:
, then there exists ÷ such that * and ÷ satisfy (NLI ) only if * and ÷ satisfy (C1
We establish the necessity of each of (C1 ÷/ * )-(C4 ÷/ * ) in turn:
, that x (Ψ ÷¬A) * A y. By (NLI ), we then have x Ψ * A y. Contradiction. Assuming (ii) leads to a contradiction in an analogous manner.
(2) Regarding (C2 ÷/ * ): As for (C1 ÷/ * ), using (C2 * ). Indeed, the lower bound constraint simply amounts to the conjunction of Success, which is equivalent to (b) , with the claim that [Ψ ÷ ¬A] c ⊆ [Ψ * A] c , which is equivalent to (a) . With this in hand, we now prove two lemmas. First:
Lemma 8 If * and ÷ satisfy (iLIRC ), then they satisfy the lower bound principle.
Establishing satisfaction of (b) is trivial. So we just need to establish satisfaction of (a) . Assume x ≺ Ψ ÷¬A y. Given (iLIRC), we will have x ≺ Ψ * A y iff either For our second lemma, we will make use of the convenient representation of TPOs by their corresponding ordered partitions of W . The ordered partition S 1 , S 2 , . . . S m of W corresponding to a TPO is such that x y iff r(x, ) ≤ r(y, ), where r(x, ) denotes the 'rank' of x with respect to and is defined by taking S r(x, ) to be the cell in the partition that contains x.
This lemma is given as follows:
Lemma 9 (Ψ ÷¬A) * NA , for any TPO satisfying the lower bound principle.
where:
Definition 5. is a binary relation on the set of TPOs over W such such that, for any TPOs 1 and 2 , whose corresponding ordered partitions are given by S 1 , S 2 , . . . , S m and T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T m respectively, 1 2 iff either (i) S i = T i for all i = 1, . . . , m, or (ii) S i ⊃ T i for the first i such that S i = T i .
partially orders T P O(W ) according to comparative 'flatness', with the flatter TPOs appearing 'greater' in the ordering, so that 1 2 iff 1 is at least as as flat as 2 . Let T 1 , . . . , T m be the ordered partition corresponding to the TPO (Ψ ÷¬A) * NA , which we will denote by N . Let be any TPO satisfying the lower bound condition: Let S 1 , . . . , S n be its corresponding ordered partition. We must show that the following relation holds: N . If T i = S i for all i, then we are done. So let i be minimal such that T i = S i . We must show S i ⊂ T i . So let y ∈ S i and assume, for contradiction, that y / ∈ T i . We know that T i = ∅, since, otherwise, j<i T j = W , hence j<i S j = W and so S i = ∅, contradicting S i = T i . So let x ∈ T i . Then, since y / ∈ T i , we have x ≺ N y. We are going to show that this entails that ∃z such that
